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This article proposes a method to accommodate asymmetric information on farmers’ risk 
preferences in designing voluntary environmental policies. By incorporating stochastic efficiency 
rules in a mechanism design problem, the government can find incentive-compatible policies by 
knowing only the general class of risk preferences among farmers. The model also accounts for 
hidden information on technology types and input use. The method is applied empirically to 
simulate a pollution control program in New York. Results suggest that participation incentives 
would be inadequate for many risk-averse producers if the government does not account for the 
diversity in risk preferences.  
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Incentive-Compatible Pollution Control Policies under Asymmetric Information on Both 
Risk Preferences and Technology 
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution remains a significant policy challenge, with obstacles that 
stem in large part from asymmetric information. The ability to assess producers’ responses to 
policies “... requires empirical knowledge of the production function, the environmental impacts 
of input use, and the risk attitudes of producers....” (Leathers and Quiggin, p. 763). The challenge 
is to devise policies that function effectively when the government’s information on these 
attributes is limited. 
One recently studied approach to finding such policies is based on the principles of 
mechanism design (e.g., Wu and Babcock, 1995, 1996; Peterson and Boisvert, 2001a,b). In cases 
where pollution and commodity outputs depend on input levels as well as a farmer’s privately 
known “technology type,” these authors propose voluntary policies designed to give farmers the 
incentive to truthfully reveal their private information. The government is aware of the different 
technology types but cannot (or chooses not to) match them to individual farmers. Instead, the 
government designs a policy “menu” consisting of (input level, government payment) pairs, and 
the policy problem is to design this menu so that farmers of different types self-select the 
appropriate policies. Feasible policies in this problem must satisfy two kinds of constraints, 
which ensure that farmers of each type would benefit by: (i) participating in the program and (ii) 
selecting the policy designed for their type over other policies. 
Although promising, these proposals address only the hidden information on technology 
types. In practice, a farmer’s incentive to truthfully reveal information on technology depends on 
other attributes that are also hidden from the government, such as risk preferences. Leathers and 
Quiggin caution that agricultural commodity and environmental policies may well have 
unintended consequences unless one knows something quite specific about a producer’s utility 
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function. For example, policy responses depend on whether producers exhibit decreasing or 
increasing absolute risk aversion (DARA and IARA, respectively), so that changes in inputs and 
environmental quality can only be predicted if we know “…how many farmers are DARA? how 
many are IARA? how many are ‘extremely’ DARA? and how many are only ‘slightly’ DARA?” 
(Leathers and Quiggin, p. 673). Even then, the results are only qualitative unless a specific 
functional form for utility is assumed. More recently, other authors have underscored the fact 
that risk preferences are likely to have a significant empirical impact on input use and policy 
responses (Isik; Roosen and Hennessy). All these authors are silent on what can be done when 
obtaining such detailed information about risk preferences is impossible or prohibitively costly.   
In the broader mechanism design literature, unknown preferences have been dealt with in 
two major ways. The first approach is to characterize the mechanism with a utility function 
whose form is left unspecified (e.g., Townsend and Mueller). While this method can be used to 
derive general properties of a mechanism, its limitation is that it cannot be applied to compute a 
mechanism in practice. The other approach is to assume a particular functional form for utility. 
Under certain conditions, this approach does lead to computable mechanisms (Rochet and Stole), 
allowing it to serve as the basis for empirical applications of mechanism design; naturally, the 
danger is that empirical results would be misleading because preferences are misspecified. 
 This article proposes a new method to accommodate limited information on agent 
preferences in policy design. The government’s policy goal is for farmers’ to truthfully reveal 
their privately known technology type when risk preferences are treated as an additional piece of 
hidden information. By incorporating stochastic efficiency criteria in a mechanism design 
problem, the government need only know the general class of preferences among agents (e.g., 
money-loving and risk-averse) and the support of their income distributions. If a solution to the 
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government’s problem exists, it ensures that all agents in the chosen class will truthfully reveal 
their private information on technology. Although we apply this method to pollution control 
policies, it is equally applicable to other mechanism design problems where decision makers are 
faced with substantial risk, and where it is believed that many or all of them are risk averse (e.g., 
designing insurance or credit institutions). 
By appealing to stochastic efficiency criteria, we address the specific concerns of 
Leathers and Quiggin and others mentioned above. Our mechanism leads to policies that “get it 
right” for producers in any given range of risk aversion. We are assured that the policies provide 
the appropriate incentives to change inputs and environmental quality in the anticipated and 
desired directions. It is well understood that these policies are likely to be more costly than if 
preferences are known. By comparing policies estimated from two limiting assumptions (one 
where all producers are risk neutral and a second, where all we know is that producers are risk 
averse), we can use our method to assess the consequences (both monetary costs and effects on 
environmental quality) of a policy design based on the wrong (or very specific) assumption about 
risk aversion. The costs of “getting it wrong” represent what the government can afford to pay to 
collect more specific data about risk preferences. 
We also devote substantial effort to examining the conditions under which a solution will 
exist and how it can be determined empirically. We show that the model can be numerically 
simulated under a broad range of conditions, and we also derive an empirically testable 
necessary condition for self-selection to be possible. Further, we demonstrate that in certain 
cases the computational burden of the simulations can be dramatically lowered. In all cases, the 
stochastic efficiency approach leads to a policy problem that can ultimately be solved with linear 
programming methods.  
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In addition, we extend existing models by accounting for hidden information on input 
use. Past studies assumed that farmers could not “cheat” on agreed input restrictions because the 
government perfectly observes input use. This assumption may be valid if the input in question is 
discrete technology or an input such as irrigation water that is regularly metered. However, many 
polluting agricultural inputs are very difficult to monitor. We show that the “cheating” problem 
can be circumvented by setting payments that depend on crop yield. This scheme shifts the 
monitoring burden to crop outputs that are in many instances are already publicly observed. Such 
payments are in fact a logical extension of many past commodity and insurance programs in the 
United States, where payments were tied to government-certified yields. 
 We apply our model to simulate a pollution control program for New York agriculture. 
Our results suggest that diversity of risk preferences should not be ignored in designing such a 
program: if the program were designed assuming all farmers are risk neutral, payments would be 
too small for risk averse farmers to be willing to participate. We also find that even if payments 
could be conditioned on monitored input levels, government costs would not be appreciably 
higher if payments were conditioned on monitored output levels instead.   
 
Conceptual Model 
Consider a region where nonpoint pollution is generated from an input used for some crop (e.g., 
fertilizer in corn production). Different production technologies in the region (e.g., soil types) are 
indexed by i  . Crop yield per acre for technology i obeys ( , )i i iy y x b , where x represents a 
random uncontrollable input such as rainfall and bi is the controllable polluting input. bi, which 
may or may not be publicly observable, could represent a continuously variable input such as 
fertilizer or it could be a binary variable representing some production practice. Emissions of 
pollution ei are jointly produced with output, so that ei = gi(x, bi, yi). In exchange for setting bi at 
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some prescribed level, the government offers payments to farmers of s – tyi per acre. Net income 
per acre for technology i is then 
(1) mi = (py – t)yi(x, bi) – pbbi – k + s  i(x, bi, t) + s 
where py and pb are output and input prices, respectively, k is fixed cost, and i(x, bi, t) is 
production profit per acre. Let the support of x be the interval [ , ]x x  and assume that x and bi are 
defined such that 0 ix  and / 0i i ii b y bde db g g y    for all i. 
 Farmers also differ by their risk preferences. Each farmer selects bi by solving: 
 max ( )
ib i
Eu m , where E is the expectation with respect to x and u(·) belongs to some set  of 
continuous, real-valued utility functions. Letting bi(t, s) represent the solution to the farmer’s 
problem, the maximized value of the objective function is denoted Eu(mi(t, s))  Eu(i(x, bi(t, s), 
t) + s). If emissions are a negative externality, the pre-policy input level bi(0, 0) (and 
consequently ei) exceeds the socially optimal level; suppose the government wishes to 
implement * (0,0)i ib b  as the target input level for technology i.1  
Although the government is assumed to know the possible types of farmers (i.e., the 
elements of  and ), it may not know which farmers are of each type. It must create a policy 
menu that induces farmers of type i to meet the input target bi* through voluntary actions. 
Designing this menu can be viewed as a two-staged game of imperfect information, where the 
government chooses a set of policies for the menu in the first stage, and farmers select from these 
policies in the second stage (Smith and Tomasi).2 The government must solve this game by 
backward induction; setting policies in the first stage requires predictions of how farmers will 
respond in the second stage. In our model, a policy can be described an ordered pair (t, s).  
This policy formulation differs from past studies in that government payments depend on 
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crop yield (–t is a marginal output payment). Previous studies considered only a fixed payment s 
in exchange for setting inputs at bi*, implicitly assuming that the government can perfectly 
monitor inputs to guarantee farmers will comply with the target input levels.3  
The government’s problem is to find a set of policies {(ti, si) : i  } satisfying the 
following constraints: 
(2) bi(ti, si)  bi* for all i  , u    
(3) Eu(mi(ti, si))  Eu(mi(0, 0)) for all i  , u   
(4) Eu(mi(ti, si))  Eu(mi(tj , sj)) for all i, j , u   
Equation (2) represents self-compliance constraints. Policies must be set so that privately 
optimal input use is no larger than the socially desirable level. The participation constraints in 
(3) require that post-policy expected utility is at least as large as pre-policy expected utility. The 
self-selection constraints in (4) guarantee that expected utility for type i’s own policy exceeds the 
expected utility for all other policies.  
 This combination of constraints is the most general case where the government has 
limited information on input use, technology types, and risk attitudes. Complete information in 
any one of these areas is a nested case where one set of constraints can be ignored. For example, 
if the government has complete information on technology types, then policies could be assigned 
to individual farmers, so that a type-i farmer would have only the choices of the policy (ti, si) or 
not participating. In this case, the self-selection conditions in (4) could be ignored. The special 
cases and their policy consequences are discussed in more detail below.   
 
Stochastic Efficiency Representation 
The primary limitation of the formulation above is that it is difficult to implement. To compute a 
feasible policy, the constraints would have to be evaluated for all u  , a prohibitive number of 
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computations in most applications where the set of admissible utility functions is extremely 
large. Such an enumeration can be avoided using stochastic efficiency criteria. For several 
specifications of , the statement that Eu(m)  Eu(m) for all u   can be equivalently 
expressed by a single stochastic efficiency condition on the distributions of m and m.  
 An appropriate such condition in our case is that of second-degree stochastic dominance 
(SSD). A cumulative distribution G(m) dominates H(m) by SSD if and only if the area under G 
is nowhere more than that of H and somewhere less than the area under H: 
   m mG m dm H m dm
 
  
 
 for all m , with strict inequality somewhere. Dominance by SSD is 
equivalent to greater expected utility for all increasing and concave utility functions (Hadar and 
Russel).4 In our model, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of income takes the form 
(5) Fi(m; b, t, s) Pr{ i(x, b, t) + s  m }.  
Type i farmers face an income distribution Fi that is conditioned on the values of b, t, and s.  
 One consequence of unknown risk preferences is that the optimal input level cannot be 
uniquely predicted. In an SSD setting, the candidates for an optimal input level are those that 
generate income distributions which are not dominated by any other distribution. These input 
levels comprise what is known as the second-degree stochastic efficient (SSE) set. Among the 
three input levels depicted in figure 1, both b and b belong to the SSE set but b does not: b is 
dominated by both b and b but neither b nor b are dominated.5 As shown by the dashed curves 
in figure 1, the value of s does not influence the SSD rankings of input levels because any s > 0 
would shift the all the cdfs by the same distance. Therefore, group i’s SSE set depends only on t; 
let Bi(t)  + denote the optimal input correspondence for group i.  
To illustrate the use of SSD in the policy scheme, consider two groups (i.e.,  = {1, 2}). 
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The government must choose policies (t1, s1) and (t2, s2) to implement the input targets b1* and 
b2*. The constraints (2) - (4), written in terms of SSD, require the policies to satisfy:  
(6) * ( ), 1, 2i i i i ib b b B t i     
(7) 0 0( ; , , ) ( ; ,0,0) ( ), (0), 1,2i i i i i i i i i i iF m b t s F m b b B t b B i      
(8) 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2( ; , , ) ( ; , , ) ( ), ( )F m b t s F m b t s b B t b B t     
(9) 1 12 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1( ; , , ) ( ; , , ) ( ), ( )F m b t s F m b t s b B t b B t     
where “ ” denotes dominance by SSD. The self-compliance constraints in equation (6) require 
each ti to be set so that the SSE set of input levels lies entirely below bi*. The participation 
constraints in equation (7) require the post-policy distributions of income to dominate the pre-
policy distributions. Similarly, the self-selection constraints in equations (8) and (9) require 
group i’s distributions of income under the policy (ti, si) to dominate those under (tj, sj). 
 When written in stochastic efficiency terms, the constraints reveal that unknown risk 
attitudes affect the policy in two ways. First, producers with different risk preferences will make 
different program enrollment decisions when presented a given policy menu. To account for this 
fact, the policy designer must compare the entire distributions of returns Fi() for the different 
menu items, rather considering only one statistic such as mean returns. Second, different 
producers’ input responses to a particular menu item will also differ. This requires the designer 
to evaluate each constraint over a range of stochastic efficient input levels bi  Bi(). In essence, 
feasible payments include a magnified risk premium that has two “layers,” implying that 
ignoring risk and/or risk aversion is likely to lead to policies that are not incentive compatible.6 
 
Computational Method for Finding Policies 
The SSD conditions also suggest a computational procedure for finding policies. Given a random 
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sample of x, SSD comparisons can be made numerically using income distributions generated 
from the sample points (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker). The steps in the procedure follow. 
1. Find the pre-policy SSE input sets B1(0) and B2(0). For group i, fix ti = 0 and discretize the 
domain of input levels. Then select two input levels bi and bi in the domain and compare the 
distribution Fi(m; bi, 0, 0) to Fi(m; bi, 0, 0) based on SSD. After repeating this comparison 
for all (bi, bi) pairs, Bi(ti) can be identified as the set of bi’s that were never dominated.  
2. Find ti sufficiently large so that (6) holds. For each i, repeat the procedure in step 1 for 
successively larger values of ti > 0 until Bi(ti) lies entirely below bi*.  
3. Find the restrictions imposed on si by the participation constraints in (7). This restriction is 
depicted in figure 2. Fi(,0,0) represents a pre-policy distribution of income associated with 
an input level in Bi(0), and Fi(, ti ,0) is an income distribution for an input level in Bi(ti) but 
with no acreage payment (i.e., under the policy (ti, 0)). An acreage payment of si > 0 will 
shift the distribution to the right in a parallel fashion, as shown by the curve Fi(, ti, si). The 
participation constraint says that si must be large enough so that Fi(, ti, si) dominates Fi(, 0, 
0) by SSD, which implies that area A in the figure must exceed area B. By iterating over the 
input levels in the sets Bi(0) and Bi(ti), the smallest value of si that satisfies (7) can be found 
numerically. Denoting this minimum value Pi, the participation constraints reduce to si  Pi. 
4. Find the restrictions on si imposed by the self-selection constraints in (8) and (9). For each i, 
this requires knowledge of the cross-policy input set Bi(tj), which can be computed similar to 
the procedure in step 2. The self-selection condition is depicted in figure 3. Initially 
assuming that si = sj = 0, the distributions Fi(, ti, 0) and Fi(, tj, 0) in the figure represent 
incomes for some bi  Bi(ti) and some ( )ji i jb B t , respectively. Assuming that the policy (tj, 
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0) is preferred to (ti, 0), as shown in the figure, si must be enlarged to is , so that ( , , )i i iF t s   
  Fi(, tj, 0). Letting Ii represent the smallest value of is  satisfying this condition over all 
admissible bi and  jib ’s, group i’s self-selection constraint (when sj = 0) becomes si  Ii. If sj 
> 0, the income distribution under group j’s policy shifts to the right by sj units, as shown by 
the dashed curve Fi(, tj, sj). In this case the SSD condition requires si to be enlarged by an 
extra sj units, implying the constraint si  Ii + sj.   
5. Find the acreage payments si that meet the restrictions found in steps 3-4. The government’s 
minimum cost acreage payments can be found by solving the following linear program: 
(10)  Minimize a1s1 + a2s2 
(11)  Subject to: si  Pi,  i = 1, 2 
 (12)    si   Ii + sj, i = 1, 2 
where ai is the number of acres of land in group i. This problem is depicted in figure 4. The 
constraints in (11) require that s1 is on or to the right of the vertical line at P1 and that s2 is 
on or above the horizontal line at P2. The constraints in (12) require s1 to lie on or to the 
right of the 45-degree line starting at I1 and s2 to lie on or above the 45-degree line starting 
at I2.  For the situation depicted in the figure, the feasible region is the shaded area and the 
objective function is minimized at point d.  
This five-step procedure reveals that ti and si need not be computed simultaneously (for 
instance, using a grid search) but instead can be found in a sequence of self-contained 
computational tasks. Such a sequence is possible because si (which is determined in steps 3-5) 
does not affect the SSD ranking of input levels (see figure 1), and therefore does not affect the 
pre-policy input levels (step 1) or the feasible level of ti (step 2). Although it has been outlined 
for the two group case, the procedure can also be extended to higher-dimension problems.7  
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 Existence of a solution in step 5 requires the feasible region to be nonempty, which will 
be true in general if: (i) P1 and P2 are finite, and (ii) I1  –I2 (see figure 4). The first of these 
conditions holds by assumption, while the second depends on the technologies of the two groups. 
A necessary condition for existence can be derived as follows. There are two necessary 
conditions for one distribution to dominate another by SSD: neither the mean of the dominant 
distribution nor its lowest observation may be smaller (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker). For the 
self-selection constraints in (8) and (9), these requirements can be written: Ei(x, bi, ti) + si  
Ei(x, bij, tj) + sj, and i(x, bi, ti) + si  i(x, bij, tj) + sj, where bi  Bi(ti) and bij  Bi(tj). 
Equivalently, si must equal or exceed the larger of [Ei(x, bij, tj) – Ei(x, bi, ti)] + sj and [i(x, bij, 
tj) – i(x, bi, ti)] + sj,  for all permissible bi and bij. Thus, Ii is at least as large as: 
(13)  
( ),
( )
max ( , , ) ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , )
j
i ji
i i i
i j i i j i
i i j i i i j i i
b B t
b B t
I E x b t E x b t x b t x b t


        
The necessary condition for separate self-selecting policies to exist is that 1 2I I   . This 
condition requires some measure of group 2’s loss in returns (either in terms of the mean or the 
lower tail of the distribution) to exceed group 1’s loss. That is, one technology is required to be 
more productive in a stochastic sense. This requirement is an instance of the more general 
“single-crossing property” encountered in the literature (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green).   
 
The Government’s Policy Alternatives 
As mentioned above, the constraints in equations (6) - (9) encompass several special cases that 
reflect different levels of government information. The government’s information set varies 
along three dimensions. First, the government may or may not be able to observe input levels. If 
observing inputs is impossible or prohibitively costly, but outputs can be observed instead, then 
the government can set a marginal output payment (–ti) that gives farmers the incentive to self-
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comply. If inputs can be observed, the government can directly condition payments on 
compliance with the target input level bi*, in which case the self-compliance constraints 
(equation (6)) can be ignored and payments need not depend on output (i.e., ti = 0).  
 Second, the government’s level of information on farmers’ technology types may vary. If 
the government does not know individual farmers’ technology types, then the government can 
set acreage payments si to ensure self-selection (at least under certain conditions as shown 
above).8 Assuming input monitoring and b1* < b2*, Peterson and Boisvert (2001b) showed that 
the minimum-cost self-selecting payments always occur at point d in figure 4. If the government 
has complete information on technology types, it could assign policies to each technology group 
and the self-selection constraints (equation (7)) could be ignored. The minimum cost payments 
would then be at point c in figure 4. These results imply that technology information is valuable 
to the government because it could be used to reduce payments (point c is less costly than point 
d). However, even if this type of information already exists, the government may avoid using it 
to differentiate policies across farmers due to political constraints (Chambers). 
 The third dimension concerns information on risk attitudes. Policies based on SSD are 
conservative in the sense that the government is assumed to know nothing about risk attitudes 
other than that farmers are risk averse—the government believes that a farmer’s risk aversion 
coefficient, r(m), could like anywhere in the range [0, ).9 In some cases, information on risk 
attitudes is more precise because r(m) is known to lie in a narrower range (e.g., based on 
empirical studies of risk behavior). Policies can be conveniently computed in these cases by 
replacing SSD in the procedure above with what is now called stochastic dominance with respect 
to a function (Meyer, King; see footnote 4). Doing so for various assumed bounds on r(m) would 
trace out the relationship between better knowledge of risk attitudes and government cost.  
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The Case of Simply Related Variables 
While the SSD formulation is feasible to implement numerically as outlined above, the 
computations can be dramatically simplified under certain conditions. This simplification is due 
to the concept of simply related random variables (Hammond). Two random variables are 
simply related if their cdf’s cross at most once. Each of the SSD conditions in (7) - (9) compares 
some random variable of the form m = i(x, b, t) + s to another random variable m = i(x, b, t) 
+ s (e.g., for the participation constraint (7), t = ti, s = si, and t = s = 0). The following result 
describes a sufficient condition for the cdf’s of these random variables (Fi and Fi, respectively) 
to intersect only once, for a given combination of (b, t) and (b, t):   
RESULT 1: If ( , , ) ( , , )i ix xx b t x b t       is positive (negative) for all x, then Fi and Fi intersect 
at most once, and Fi intersects Fi from above (from below) if the distributions do cross. 
Proofs for this and all other results are in the appendix. 
Intuitively, the simply related property follows from the one-to-one relationship between 
x and income: each realization of income is associated with a unique value of x, and larger 
incomes are associated with larger x’s because 0ix  .  If  > 0, then a given change in x causes 
a larger change in m than in m, so that Fi is geometrically “flatter” and can only intersect Fi 
from above.  The opposite case is where  < 0, so that Fi is “steeper” than Fi.  If  switches 
sign somewhere in the domain of x, then Fi and Fi may intersect more than once.  
Although the condition in Result 1 must be checked empirically and is not guaranteed to 
hold, it is not unlikely. Kramer and Pope argued that the simply related property holds for many 
agricultural applications. This property is actually guaranteed if inputs can be monitored (so that 
t = t = 0) and ixby  does not change sign in the domain of x, because  is positive (negative) for 
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all x if and only if ixby  is positive (negative). Peterson and Boisvert (2001b) showed that if 
i
xby  is 
positive (negative), then b is a risk increasing (risk decreasing) input. 
The advantage of simply related variables is that the SSD conditions can be very easily 
evaluated, because the two necessary conditions for SSD are also sufficient. Formally: 
RESULT 2: Suppose m and m are simply related, with cdfs Fi and Fi, respectively.  The sufficient 
conditions for Fi to dominate Fi by SSD are: (i) m  m and (ii) Em  Em, where m and m 
are the lowest observations with positive probability. 
This result has two useful implications for solving the policy problem in practice: 
RESULT 3:  Suppose that the profits at any two input levels (i.e., i(x, b, t) and i(x, b, t)) are 
simply related random variables.  Then the SSE set of input levels Bi(t) is a closed interval of 
real numbers bounded by i
b
b( t ) arg max ( x,b,t )   and i
b
b( t ) arg max E ( x,b,t )  . 
RESULT 4: Consider a condition of the form: 
(14) ( ; , , ) ( ; , , ) ( ), ( )i i i iF m b t s F m b t s b B t b B t       . 
If the two cdfs are simply related, then condition (14) is equivalent to the requirement:  
(15)  max ( , , ) ( , , ), ( , , ) ( , , ) : ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )i i i is s E x b t E x b t x b t x b t b b t b t b b t b t                 
Result 3 allows each of the SSE sets required in steps 1 and 2 of the procedure above to be found 
by solving two nonlinear maximization problems. Result 4 simplifies the search for the bounds 
Pi and Ii in steps 3 and 4, which involve several SSD comparisons of the form in (14). Even 
though each SSD condition must be satisfied for all pairs (b, b)  Bi(t)  Bi(t), a sufficient 
condition for this to hold (equation (15)) involves computations at only four points (b is either 
the upper or lower bound of Bi(t) and b is either the upper or lower bound of Bi(t)). Result 4 also 
implies that if I1 and I2 are computed using equation (15), then the condition I1  –I2 is both 
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necessary and sufficient for self-selecting payments to exist. 
 
Empirical Application to Nitrate Loss from New York Corn Production 
The model is applied to simulate a program to reduce nitrate contamination of drinking water in 
central New York. Nitrates reach water supplies by leaching into aquifers and through surface 
runoff following storm events. Elevated levels of nitrate leaching and runoff in the region are due 
in large part to the use of nitrogen fertilizer on corn acreage. In the simulated program, corn 
producers would receive payments in return for reductions in nitrogen fertilizer use.  
 
Empirical Model Components 
Corn silage yield functions were estimated from data collected at field trials run by the 
Department of Soil, Crop, and Atmospheric Sciences at Cornell University. The data include 276 
observations of corn silage yield (y), commercial fertilizer, manure application, and growing 
season rainfall (x) at several sites in New York over several crop years. Total nitrogen applied 
(b) was computed as the sum of fertilizer and manure nitrogen. The soils at the sites were divided 
into two groups (indexed by i = 1, 2) based on their hydrologic characteristics, which become the 
different technologies in the simulations.10  
To gain efficiency, the functions were estimated in a pooled regression using a quadratic 
specification. The model was fit by maximum likelihood, with the parameters bounded so that 
the derivative in x is positive to be consistent with the theoretical model.  The results are: 
(16) y = –15.12 + 0.699dm + 25.71d2 + 0.1001b – 0.00024b2 + 0.000057d2b2 + 1.51x  
      (–5.01)   (1.56)        (9.38)       (6.67)        (–6.09)            (2.04)          (10.08) 
 
 –1.37d2x – 0.0007bx,      R2 = 0.56, 
  (–9.59)    (–1.40) 
where t-ratios are in parentheses, and dm and d2 are dummy variables for manure application and 
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group 2 soils, respectively. The interaction terms d2b2 and d2x allow the shape of the yield 
function in nitrogen and rainfall to differ by group. The estimated coefficients on d2b2 and d2x 
are both statistically different from zero, and their signs imply that group 2 has a higher marginal 
product of nitrogen but a smaller marginal product of rainfall. At the data means, a one-pound 
increase in nitrogen increases yield by 0.023 tons and 0.038 tons per acre for groups 1 and 2, 
respectively, while a one-inch increase in rainfall raises yield by 1.42 tons and 0.05 tons, 
respectively. Additional details on the data and estimation are in Peterson and Boisvert (2001b).  
 Profits for group i were simulated by equation (1), where the policy variable bi is nitrogen 
from commercial fertilizer.11 In these simulations, x takes on values from a sample of growing 
season rainfall observations at the Ithaca weather station over the 30-year period 1963-1992. The 
prices py and pb were set at the mean of observed corn silage and nitrogen prices (in constant 
1992 dollars) over the same 30 years, where corn silage prices were imputed as a corn grain 
equivalent. Other costs k were based on enterprise budgets from USDA and Schmit.  
Nitrate emissions were defined as the sum of leaching and runoff: ei = eiR + eiL. Emissions 
were simulated using a recursive system estimated by Boisvert, Regmi, and Schmit, of the form: 
(17) ( , , ), ( , , , )i i iR R i i L L i i Re e b e e b e x c x c  
x contains four weather variables (total annual rainfall; rainfall within 14 days of planting, 
fertilizer, and harvest), and ci denotes group i’s soil characteristics (field slope, percent organic 
matter, soil horizon depth, and the erodibility factor “K”). The New York soils data used to 
estimate this model and its translog specification are described in Boisvert, Regmi, and Schmit.  
 Policy targets for fertilizer were computed using chance constraints (Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman). Probability distributions of emissions from each soil were simulated from annual 
weather observations in Ithaca from 1963-1992. Values of bi*  were then found by iteratively 
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reducing fertilizer until nitrate emissions exceeded e* = 25 pounds per acre with a probability of 
no more than  = 0.1. This procedure led to estimated targets of b1* = 55 and b2* = 82. 
 
Policy Simulations 
Policies were simulated under several scenarios to study the effects of hidden information. All 
simulations were conducted using the five-step procedure outlined above, which could be 
simplified to involve only mean and lower-tail profits because the sufficient condition for simply 
related random variables was satisfied (Result 1).12 Table 1 reports the fertilizer levels, profits, 
and production for each of the policies; payments are in table 2. The policy scenarios vary along 
the three dimensions in the government’s information set.  
The first dimension is information on fertilizer use. In the output monitoring scenarios, 
fertilizer use cannot be observed and farmers receive payments of the form si –tiyi. In the input 
monitoring scenarios, the government can observe fertilizer use so that the acreage payments si 
could be conditioned directly on meeting the fertilizer targets bi*; the marginal output payments ti 
were set to zero in these cases (table 2). The effects of information on fertilizer use are well 
illustrated by the SSD-based policies that are assigned by soil (the upper-left block of numbers). 
If fertilizer use were unobservable (but output could be monitored), the expected net payments 
per acre, E[si – tiyi], were in the range of about $4-$7 for group 1 and $9-$14 for group 2 (table 
2).13 If fertilizer could be observed, then the groups would receive acreage payments of about $6 
and $12 per acre, respectively. Based on these results, information on input use does not appear 
to have a large impact on government costs.  
The second dimension is soils information. One set of scenarios here is assigned policies 
by soil type, which requires the use of soils information by farm. In these cases, the self-selection 
constraints were ignored and acreage payments si were set at the participation bounds (Pi). The 
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other possibilities, where soils information is not used, are self-selected policies or a uniform 
policy for all soils. The estimated yield relationships imply that self-selecting policies do not 
exist, so that the government’s only alternative to assigned policies is a uniform policy.14 The 
uniform policies were computed by first setting the marginal output payment (or fertilizer levels 
for input monitoring) at the more stringent of the two individual policies, to ensure that 
environmental targets were met for both groups. The acreage payments were then adjusted to 
ensure that both groups would be willing to participate.  
 The value of soils information can be revealed by comparing a uniform and assigned 
policies. Consider first this comparison for the SSD scenarios with output monitoring (the first 
column of numbers in table 2). If the government obtained enough soils information to assign 
policies, then payments to group 2 would not be affected (they would receive about $9-$14 in 
either case), but the payment to group 1 could be reduced from about $7-$10 to $4-$7. This cost 
savings is the value of soils information to the government, and reflects an “information rent” of 
about $4 earned by group 1 in a uniform policy. In the input monitoring case (the second column 
of numbers), the implied value of information would be even larger because both groups would 
earn information rents, of about $14 and $19 per acre, respectively.15 
Third, scenarios differ by information on risk attitudes. Here, one group of scenarios 
assumes that the government knows only that farmers are risk averse to varying degrees, so that 
policies must be computed based on SSD. The other scenarios assume that all farmers have 
identical preferences and are risk neutral. In the risk neutral cases, policies were computed by 
considering only mean profits in each step. The value of risk information can be found by 
comparing the SSD and risk neutral results. If the government initially believed farmers are risk 
averse to unknown degrees (the SSD case), and then learned that all farmers are risk neutral, this 
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information would be valuable because payments could be reduced by up to $7 per acre (table 2). 
More plausibly, the government would improve its information on risk attitudes by learning that 
risk aversion coefficients have some upper bound r . Peterson and Boisvert (2001b) calculated 
payments under input monitoring using stochastic dominance with respect to a function, with 
0.03r  .16 Payments for this bounded case were up to $5 smaller than those under SSD.  
 The results also illustrate the consequences of incorrect assumptions on risk attitudes. 
The difference between SSD and risk neutral payments represents a risk premium that accounts 
for up to about 47% of SSD payments. If the government incorrectly assumed that all farmers 
were risk neutral, then payments would be too small for risk-averse farmers to be willing to 
participate.17 In the bounded model studied by Peterson and Boisvert (2001b), the estimated risk 
premium was somewhat smaller (up to about $3 or 37% of payments under bounded risk 
aversion). Nevertheless, non-participation in the program was a dominant strategy for risk-averse 
farmers if payments were computed under risk neutrality.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As mentioned above, self-selecting policies were not possible because the estimated marginal 
products were quite similar across groups. At the data means, the difference in estimated 
marginal products of nitrogen is 0.015 tons (30 pounds), which translates to less than 0.1% of 
mean yield. The estimated differential may have been muted because of the specific soils used in 
the field trials; previous agronomic evidence suggests that light and heavy soils in New York 
respond to nitrogen quite differently (Peterson and Boisvert, 2001a).  
To explore the effect of a larger productivity differential, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed on the coefficient for d2b2 in the yield equation, which had a point estimate of 
0.000057. Table 3 presents the results for a coefficient value of 0.0001, which raises the 
 20
difference in marginal products at mean nitrogen to 0.026 tons (52 pounds). In this case, self-
selected policies are possible and are shown in the bottom half of the table. The most significant 
difference between these and the base results for a uniform policy (table 2) is that output 
monitoring is substantially more costly than input monitoring. The expected net payments under 
output monitoring are in the range of $30 and $21 for the two groups, respectively, which are 
three to four times the payments under input monitoring (table 3). This suggests that the least-
cost monitoring scheme is sensitive to technical parameters and must be evaluated empirically.  
 
Policy Implications 
This article demonstrates both the theoretical and empirical possibility of successfully designing 
a voluntary environmental program when the government’s information is limited. In particular, 
we identified the structure of policies necessary to ensure incentive compatibility when both risk 
attitudes and technology are unknown. We outlined a computational procedure for finding 
policies that accommodates unknown risk attitudes through stochastic efficiency criteria. We 
also derived an empirically verifiable necessary condition for self-selection to be possible, and 
showed that in certain cases the stochastic efficiency comparisons can be simplified to involve a 
small number of computations involving lower-tail and mean income.  
The model was simulated for a program that would offer government payments to New 
York corn producers in exchange for fertilizer reductions. The results suggest that monitoring 
corn yields could be substituted for the potentially costly and intrusive monitoring of fertilizer 
use. Although the results differ with technical parameters, expected net payments were 
frequently lower when they were tied to crop yields instead of fertilizer levels. Overall, average 
net payments were below $15 per acre, which are smaller than typical farm program payments 
received by New York producers in the past. Self-selection would be possible in cases where the 
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marginal productivity of nitrogen differs substantially across soils. 
Simulated payments could be reduced if the government assigned policies to specific 
soils, and in this sense information on the distribution of soils across farms is valuable to the 
government. This type of information already exists in many states. In New York, for example, 
the use-value assessment program requires local officials to record each farm’s acreage in each 
of ten soil productivity groups. Policy makers would need to weigh these cost savings against the 
political and other consequences of conditioning policy eligibility and benefits on a farmer’s 
resource setting. 
Policies were also simulated for both the risk averse and risk neutral cases. Pannell, 
Malcom, and Kingwell have argued that the insight gained by modeling risk aversion is more 
pronounced for discrete decisions (such as the adoption of new technology) than for continuous 
decisions regarding input use, since in the latter case the results are often very similar to a risk 
neutral model. In the New York application of our policy model, the risk neutral and risk averse 
results for optimal inputs and profits are indeed similar, with expected incomes that often differ 
by less than $1 per acre. However, with respect to the program participation decision, the 
incentive compatibility constraints magnify the effect of risk aversion. If payments were 
designed assuming risk neutrality, environmental objectives could well be sacrificed because risk 
averse farmers would have insufficient incentives to participate in the program voluntarily. 
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Footnotes 
1The method for finding this target level is not modeled explicitly. In practice, the choice is 
often made through a second-best standards approach, where input targets are set to meet some 
predetermined emissions target (Baumol and Oates).  
2In general, this game involves the government and all producers, so that any farmer’s 
choice may depend strategically on the choices of all other famrers. If all policy options are 
available to any farmer regardless of others’ choices, and the distributions of technology and risk 
attitudes are independent, this strategic interdependence can be ignored and the policy becomes a 
large number of two-player games between the government and each producer.  
3Output-dependent payments require monitoring of yields, which are generally much easier 
to observe than inputs and need to be measured only once a year. In cases where neither input 
nor output can be observed, the alternative is to use random spot checks on target input levels 
and assess penalties on violators. This is the typical approach for industrial-type emissions that 
occur continuously or at least very frequently (e.g., Malik; Florens and Foucher). The 
mechanism design below could be modified to accommodate spot checks and penalties; these 
modifications are described in a supplement available from the authors. 
4Formally, if G(m) dominates H(m) by SSD, then Eu(m)  Eu(m) for all continuous and 
twice differentiable u() with u > 0 and u  0 (Hadar and Russell, p. 31).  Other stochastic 
efficiency criteria exist for other specifications of the utility set . For example, Meyer has 
discovered a set of criteria, named stochastic dominance with respect to a function, which can 
order distributions when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion lies in a specified range. 
5b does not dominate b because Fi(m; b, t, 0) starts to the left of Fi(m; b, t, 0), and b does 
not dominate b because area A is smaller than area B. 
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6To illustrate, consider the participation constraint in equation (7). Given a ti, si must be 
large enough so that the policy (ti, si) dominates (0, 0). If risk neutrality is assumed, participation 
could be secured by a payment of 0( , ,0) ( , ,0)
i i
i is E x b E x b    , where b0 and bi are the 
solutions to max{Ei(x, b, 0)} and max{Ei(x, b, ti)}, respectively. But if farmers are risk averse 
in reality, this payment will generally be insufficient because it does not include a risk premium. 
Based on the usual definition, the risk premium required is the value ri such that 
( ; , , ) ( ; ,0,0)i i i i i i iF m b t s r F m b  . However, this risk premium is generally not large enough 
because the SSD condition must hold for all bi  Bi(ti) and b0  Bi(0). 
7With additional groups, the computational burden increases linearly in steps 1-2, because 
the pre-policy input levels and the ti’s must be determined separately for each of n groups. 
Similarly, the participation constraints in step 3 must be found for each i = 1, ..., n. In step 4, 
there would be a total of n!/(n – 2)! self-selection constraints to find, one for each (i, j) pair. 
8If self-selection is desired, the government has a commitment problem, in that producers 
may believe policies will be assigned to them once they reveal their type by selecting a policy. 
This problem could be avoided through the use of a multiple-year, binding contract, although the 
government would still know the farmer’s type for future contract periods. We are indebted to a 
reviewer for making this observation. 
9This coefficient is defined as r(m) = –u(m)/u(m); it is positive for risk-averse individuals. 
10Manure was credited with 3 pounds of nitrogen per ton to obtain total nitrogen applied. 52 
of the 276 observations are from group 1, corresponding to Hydrologic Group A soils, while the 
224 remaining observations (group 2) are from Hydrologic Group B soils. A soils are coarser and 
more vulnerable to leaching than B soils (Boisvert, Regmi, and Schmit).  
11Farmers were assumed to always apply 20 tons of manure per acre to dispose of animal 
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waste. 
12Because the estimated yield functions yi(x, b) are linear in x, the quantity 
( , , ) ( , , )i ix xx b t x b t        is a constant (either positive or negative) for all (b, t) and (b, t). 
13The expected values assume a range of values under SSD because they correspond to a 
range of optimal fertilizer levels (table 2). 
14The self-selection bounds were I1 = –11.35 and I2 = 18.59, which violate the necessary 
condition for self-selection because I1 > –I2. The underlying difficulty is the similarity in 
marginal products of fertilizer across groups. Sensitivity results with a wider gap in marginal 
productivities are presented below for comparison. 
15If fertilizer is monitored, the uniform policy would have to require b* = 55 pounds per acre 
to meet both environmental targets (table 1). An acreage payment of $25.24 is then needed to 
ensure both group would be willing to participate in the program. This payment exceeds the 
assigned payments by about $19 and $14 for groups 1 and 2, respectively (table 2). 
16This value was chosen as a plausible upper bound based on published estimates of risk 
coefficients. Such estimates must be properly calibrated because they are not invariant to the 
level of income (Grube). The bound of 0.03 reflects empirical evidence on risk coefficients when 
the amount of income at stake is in the range of $100 to $1,000 (Grube, Tauer). 
17For our model specification, the risk neutral results are equivalent to those from assuming 
no uncertainty. As a reviewer points out, the quadratic production function implies that the effect 
of rainfall on the marginal product of fertilizer is constant, so that max{Ei(x, b, t)} is equivalent 
to max{i(Ex, b, t)}. Thus, in this case, ignoring risk as the same consequences as ignoring risk 
aversion; both lead to violations of incentive compatibility. 
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Appendix  
 
Proof of Result 1 
Suppose that 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i
m
F m F m
m m
       is negative (positive) for all mˆ ; i.e., Fi is everywhere flatter 
(steeper) than Fi. This implies that if the distributions cross, Fi intersects Fi from above (below).  
We will prove that m < (>) 0 if and only if  > (<) 0.  Let Fx be the cdf of x (i.e., Fx(a)  Pr{x  
a}), and define X(m) and X(m) as the inverse functions of m and m respectively, such that 
X(i(x, b, t) + s) = x and X(i(x, b, t) + s) = x. Applying X() and X()to both sides of the 
inequalities inside Fi and Fi, based on the definition in (5): 
Fi(m) = Pr{x  X(m)} = Fx(X(m))      and       Fi(m) = Pr{x  X(m)}= Fx(X(m)) 
At an intersection point mˆ : 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( )i i x xF m F m F X m F X m X m X m        
Letting Xˆ  represent the value of ˆ ˆ( ) ( )X m X m , m can be written in terms of Fx as follows:   
(18) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )x x x
m
F X F X F XX X X X
X m X m X m m
                      
By the inverse function theorem, X/m = 1/ix(x, b, t) and X/m = 1/ix(x, b, t). Substituting 
these relationships into (18) and noting that Fx/X > 0 by the definition of a cdf, m < (>) 0 is 
equivalent to: 1/ix(x, b, t) < (>) = 1/ix(x, b, t).  Rearranging, ix(x, b, t) > (<) ix(x, b, t), which 
is the desired result. 
 
Proof of Result 2 
SSD requires that ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
m
i iS m F m F m dm

 

  0 for all m , with strict inequality for some m .  
We prove this condition holds if Fi and Fi are simply related and hypotheses (i) and (ii) are met.  
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There are three cases to consider: 
Case 1: Fi and Fi do not intersect. Under hypotheses (i) and (ii) Result 2, Fi must lie strictly to 
the right of Fi in this case.  Thus, Fi(m) < Fi(m) for all m, and ( ) 0S m   for all m . 
Case 2.  Fi and Fi intersect at their lower tails. Here m = m; since the distributions cannot cross 
a second time, Fi must lie either strictly to the right or left of Fi for m > m.  Hypothesis (ii) 
precludes the second possibility, which implies that Fi(m) < Fi(m) for all m > m.  Thus, 
( ) 0S m   for all m m m   and ( ) 0S m   for all m m . 
Case 3. Fi and Fi intersect above their lower tails. In this case ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i iF m F m  for some 
ˆ ,m m m .  Since mˆ  can be the only intersection point, hypothesis (i) implies that m > m.  Thus, 
Fi must lie strictly to the right of Fi up to mˆ  (i.e., Fi(m) < Fi(m) ˆm m  ), so that ( ) 0S m   for 
all ˆm m .  For ˆm m , 
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
m
i i
m
S m S m F m F m dm  

 .  The second component is positive 
and monotonically increasing in m  since Fi lies to the left of Fi after the intersection point (i.e., 
Fi(m) > Fi(m) for m > mˆ ).  However, hypothesis (ii) guarantees that it never becomes large 
enough to exceed ˆ( )S m  in absolute value. To see this, note that Em  Em means that 
[ ] 0i im dF dF


  , or, integrating by parts, [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] 0i i i im F m F m F m F m dm      .  
Since Fi(m) = Fi(m) = 0 and ( ) ( ) 1i iF m F m  , the first term in brackets equals zero.  Therefore, 
lim ( ) 0
m
S m   .   
 
Proof of Result 3 
We will show that a b below or above both ( )b t  and ( )b t  is dominated by some input level but a 
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b between ( )b t  and ( )b t  is not. We do not know a priori whether ( )b t  is larger or smaller than 
( )b t . Suppose first that ( ) ( )b t b t . To begin, note that strict concavity of ( , , )i x b t  and 
( , , )iE x b t  in b implies that: (i) ( , , )i x b t  is strictly increasing (decreasing) for all ( ) ( )b b t  , 
and (ii) ( , , )iE x b t  is strictly increasing (decreasing) for all ( ) ( )b b t  . Thus, for any ( )b b t : 
 ( , , ) ( , ( ), ) and ( , , ) ( , ( ), )i i i ix b t x b t t E x b t E x b t t       
where the inequalities follow from the definition of ( )b t  and fact (ii), respectively.  Therefore, 
by result 1, ( )b t  dominates b by SSD. Similarly, for any ( )b b t : 
 ( , , ) ( , ( ), ) and ( , , ) ( , ( ), )i i i ix b t x b t t E x b t E x b t t       
by fact (i) and the definition of ( )b t , implying that ( )b t  dominates b by SSD.  Finally, consider 
any two input levels b, b such that ( ) ( )b t b b b t   .  Neither of these input levels can 
dominate the other because: 
 ( , , ) ( , , ) and ( , , ) ( , , )i i i ix b t x b t E x b t E x b t        
That is, one of the necessary conditions for either b or b to dominate is violated.  A parallel set 
of arguments verifies that if ( ) ( )b t b t  then: ( )b t  dominates all b < ( )b t ; ( )b t  dominates all b 
> ( )b t ; and for any b < b in the interval [ ( ), ( )]b t b t , neither input level dominates the other.  
 
Proof of Result 4 
By Result 3, B(t) is the closed interval of real numbers bounded by ( )b t  and ( )b t .  To begin, we 
must establish that ( )b B t  , ( , , )i x b t  is bounded between ( , ( ), )i x b t t  and ( , ( ), )i x b t t , and 
that ( , , )iE x b t  is bounded between ( , ( ), )iE x b t t  and ( , ( ), )iE x b t t .  By the definition of a 
maximum ( , , )i x b t   ( , ( ), )i x b t t  for all b  B(t).  Since B(t) is a closed and bounded interval, 
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any b  B(t) can be written ( ) (1 ) ( )b b t b t     for some   [0, 1].  By the concavity of 
( , , )i x b t  in b, ( , , )i x b t   ( , ( ), ) (1 ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )i i ix b t t x b t t x b t t      .  A parallel set of 
arguments verifies that ( , ( ), )iE x b t t   ( , , )iE x b t   ( , ( ), )iE x b t t  for all b  B(t).   
 Now suppose group i faces the policy alternatives (t, s) and (t, s) and that all of the 
following conditions are met:  
(19) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) , ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )i i i ix b t t s x b t t s E x b t t s x b t t s                
(20) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) , ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )i i i ix b t t s x b t t s E x b t t s E x b t t s                
(21) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) , ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )i i i ix b t t s x b t t s E x b t t s E x b t t s                
(22) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) , ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )i i i ix b t t s x b t t s E x b t t s E x b t t s                
Conditions (19) - (20) and the bounds on ( , , )i x b t   and ( , , )iE x b t   established above imply: 
(23) ( , ( ), ) ( , , ) , ( , ( ), ) ( , , ) ( )i i i ix b t t s x b t s E x b t t s E x b t s b B t                    
Similarly, (21) - (22) and the bounds on profits imply: 
(24) ( , ( ), ) ( , , ) , ( , ( ), ) ( , , ) ( )i i i ix b t t s x b t s E x b t t s E x b t s b B t                    
Finally, (23) - (24) and the bounds on ( , , )i x b t  and ( , , )iE x b t  imply that: 
(25) ( , , ) ( , , ) , ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ), ( )i i i ix b t s x b t s E x b t s E x b t s b B t b B t                      
By Result 2, (25) is sufficient to guarantee that: 
(26) ( ; , , ) ( ; , , )i iF m b t s F m b t s    b  B(t), b  B(t) 
An equivalent way of expressing the conditions in (19) - (22) is that:  
(27) 
( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )
( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )
max
( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )
( , ( ), ) ( , ( )
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i
i i
x b t t x b t t E x b t t E x b t t
x b t t x b t t E x b t t E x b t t
s s
x b t t x b t t E x b t t E x b t t
x b t t x b t
        
                  
    , ) ( , ( ), ) ( , ( ), )i it E x b t t E x b t t
          
 
That is, (27) implies (26), which is the desired result.   
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Figure 1. Geometry of stochastic efficient input levels 
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Figure 2. Geometry of the participation constraint 
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Figure 3. Geometry of the self-selection constraint 
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Figure 4. Geometry of the policy design problem 
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Table 1. Pre- and Post-Policy Fertilizer, Income, and Production, Various Policy Scenarios 
 Risk Aversion (SSD)  Risk Neutrality 
  Output Input   Output Input 
Item Pre-Policy Monitoring Monitoring   Pre-Policy Monitoring Monitoring 
Assigned Policies by Soil        
  Fertlizer, group 1 (lb/acre) 83-92 46-55 55  83 55 55 
  Mean income, group 1 ($/acre) 225-226 226 229  226 226 226 
  Mean yield, group 1 (tons/acre) 23.7-23.9 22.8-23.0 23.0  23.7 23.0 23 
  Fertlizer, group 2 (lb/acre) 127-139 70-82 82  127 82 82 
  Mean income, group 2 ($/acre) 212-213 215 217  213 213 213 
  Mean yield, group 2 (tons/acre) 23.8-24.0 22.2-22.7 22.7  23.8 22.7 22.7 
Uniform Policy         
  Fertlizer, group 1 (lb/acre) 83-92 39-48 55  83 48 55 
  Mean income, group 1 ($/acre) 225-226 228 248  226 226 241 
  Mean yield, group 1 (tons/acre) 23.7-23.9 22.5-22.8 23.0  23.7 22.8 23 
  Fertlizer, group 2 (lb/acre) 127-139 70-82 55  127 82 55 
  Mean income, group 2 ($/acre) 212-213 215 219  213 213 213 
  Mean yield, group 2 (tons/acre) 23.8-24.0 22.2-22.7 21.6  23.8 22.7 21.6 
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Table 2.  Mean Optimal Payments and Information Premiums      
 Risk Aversion (SSD)  Risk Neutrality 
 Output Input Output Input 
Item Monitoring Monitoring  Monitoring Monitoring
Assigned Policies by Soil      
  Output payment, group 1 ($/ton) -9.86 0.00  -8.49 0.00 
  Acreage payment, group 1 ($/acre) 230.81 6.33  199.24 3.60 
  Expected net payment, group 1 ($/acre) 3.61-6.53 6.33  3.61 3.60 
  Output payment, group 2 ($/ton) -10.68 0.00  -9.54 0.00 
  Acreage payment, group 2 ($/acre) 251.06 11.62  223.43 7.29 
  Expected net payment, group 2 ($/acre) 9.13-13.69 11.62  7.30 7.29 
Uniform Policy      
  Output payment ($/ton) -10.68 0.00  -9.54 0.00 
  Acreage payment ($/acre) 251.06 25.24  223.43 18.63 
  Expected net payment, group 1 ($/acre) 7.29-10.77 25.24  5.66 18.63 
  Soils information rent, group 1 ($/acre) 3.68-4.24 18.91  2.05 15.03 
  Expected net payment, group 2 ($/acre) 9.13-13.69 25.24  7.30 18.63 
  Soils information rent, group 2 ($/acre) 0.00 13.62  0.00 11.34 
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Table 3.  Mean Optimal Payments and Information Premiums, Self-selecting Policies 
 Risk Aversion (SSD) Risk Neutrality 
 Output Input Output Input 
Item Monitoring Monitoring  Monitoring Monitoring 
Assigned Policies by Soil     
  Output payment, group 1 ($/ton) -9.86 0.00 -8.49 0.00 
  Acreage payment, group 1($/acre) 230.81 6.33 199.24 3.60 
  Expected net payment, group 1 ($/acre) 3.61-6.53 6.33 3.61 3.60 
  Output payment, group 2 ($/ton) -9.00 0.00 -8.08 0.00 
  Acreage payment, group 2 ($/acre) 237.01 5.15 213.31 5.15 
  Expected net payment, group 2($/acre) 20.82-22.01 5.15 19.25 5.15 
Self-Selected Policies     
  Output payment, group 1 ($/ton) -9.86 0.00 -8.49 0.00 
  Acreage payment, group 1($/acre) 256.85 11.48 222.77 8.75 
  Expected net payment, group 1 ($/acre) 29.65-32.58 11.48 27.14 8.75 
  Soils information rent, group 1 ($/acre) 26.04 5.15 23.53 0.00 
  Output payment, group 2 ($/ton) -9.00 0.00 -8.08 0.00 
  Acreage payment, group 2 ($/acre) 237.01 5.15 213.31 5.15 
  Expected net payment, group 2 ($/acre) 20.82-22.01 5.15 19.25 5.15 
  Soils information rent, group 2 ($/acre) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
